Rise of ISIS Page 3
While al-Baghdadi began his terrorist career in Iraq, he truly prospered in Syria. By the end of the Surge, AQI/ISI was largely a spent force, unable to inflict casualties on Americans or Iraqis. The numbers tell the story. For example, in late 2007 in Diyala Province (the heart of the Islamic State of Iraq), 25 percent of all American convoys came under some kind of armed attack. In other words, every time an American soldier rolled out of the gate, he faced a 1-in-4 chance of an IED strike, ambush, or other kind of attack. By the end of 2008, that chance had dropped to 1 in 100. Fewer than 1 percent of all convoys faced combat.
And those improvements were nationwide. For American soldiers, the height of the Surge—2007—was the bloodiest year of the war, with 961 soldiers lost. In 2008, that number shrank to 322, then 150 the next year, 60 the next, and 54 in 2011, the final year of significant American combat operations. Civilian casualties faced a similar sharp drop. From July 2006 to August 2007, no fewer than 1,006 Iraqi civilians died every month, with the casualties peaking in the dreadful month of September 2006, when 3,389 Iraqi civilians died. But by the end of July 2011, when America was ending its involvement, the number had dropped to 121.47 In other words, jihadists no longer had the power to threaten the Iraqi nation.
These gains happened primarily through sheer force of American courage and will. In my coauthor’s area of operations alone, the stories of heroism were legion:
There was the sergeant first-class who helped rescue a convoy from an ambush despite being shot in the neck, refusing medical evacuation until we was certain that every other American casualty was on their way.
There was story after story of young soldiers, seriously injured, who literally fought back at medics who tried to hold them down and take them out of the fight—they were that determined not to leave their brothers behind on the battlefield.
There was the sergeant who literally wrestled two terrorists to the ground with his bare hands, saving his platoon leader from a surprise attack.
Then there were the stories of these same warriors showing kindness to impoverished Iraqis, in one instance, literally braving hostile gunfire to deliver sheep to a community that had lost everything due to the constant combat.
The stories could go on, but it’s vital to understand that a dry recitation of numbers does not do justice to the courage of Americans who fought in Iraq and turned the tide. Many paid the ultimate price, and their sacrifice must be remembered.
In the spring of 2011, however, just as the Iraq War seemed to be winding down, a rebellion broke out in Syria against Bashar al-Assad, the country’s brutal Ba’athist dictator (Iraq’s Saddam Hussein was also a Ba’athist, a socialist Arab nationalist party that arose in the immediate aftermath of World War II). As the rebellion gained strength, Sunni jihadists—like the remnants of AQI/ISI—flowed into Syria, eager to take another chance to establish a true Islamic state.
And they succeeded.
Facing a corrupt dictator’s army rather than courageous and well-equipped American soldiers, jihadists soon dominated the battlefield in much of northern Syria, ruling entire cities and regions. It was in this fight that al-Baghdadi distinguished himself as a skilled battlefield commander and tactician.48 His battle tactics and leadership skills appealed to young jihadists, to the extent that ISIS may now hold greater appeal for young jihadists than al-Qaeda.49
Moreover, under al-Baghdadi’s leadership, ISIS prospered financially. ISIS previously relied on donations from wealthy individuals in the Gulf Arab states who were supporting ISIS in the Syrian conflict50 (donations to terrorists are not unusual in the Muslim world; Saudi Arabia once held a telethon to fund the families of Palestinian suicide bombers). But ISIS now has cash and assets of its own. Al-Baghdadi has secured two primary revenue streams: oil sales from ISIS-controlled oil fields in Syria and sales of antiquities from looted historical sites.51 ISIS accumulated cash and assets worth an estimated $2 billion, making it arguably the wealthiest terror organization in the world.52 When ISIS overran Mosul, Iraq, its forces looted banks of cash and precious metals.53
Flush with new-found wealth and empowered by his military success, on June 29, 2014, al-Baghdadi declared himself to be “Caliph Ibrahim.”54 A statement published by ISIS to support al-Baghdadi’s designation as caliph listed his qualifications as follows: “The mujahid, the scholar who practices what he preaches, the worshipper, the leader, the warrior, the reviver, the descendant from the family of the Prophet, the slave of Allah.”55
CHAPTER THREE
ISIS
THE WORLD’S MOST RUTHLESS AND POWERFUL JIHADIST ARMY
ISIS has emerged as not just the most ruthless of the Sunni jihadist organizations in Iraq and Syria; it is also the most successful. ISIS is so extreme that other well-known, radical Islamist and jihadist groups have not only distanced themselves from ISIS, they have also publicly condemned ISIS’s actions and even fought ISIS fighters directly.1 ISIS jihadists commit violence against fellow Muslims in violation of Islamic law; they routinely commit war crimes and engage in torture in violation of international law; and they also kill and threaten Christian, Jewish, and other religious communities. In short, ISIS is composed of religiously motivated psychopaths.
Not only are ISIS leaders and fighters ruthless, but they also have obtained sufficient material assets to support a standing military force. They possess the will to use weapons of mass destruction to carry out their fanatical aims. They’re no longer a terrorist gang, but a terrorist army possessing greater striking power than any terrorist force in the Middle East, greater striking power than al-Qaeda ever possessed.
Ominously, this terrorist army is proving to be irresistibly attractive to a subset of British and American Muslim men, with hundreds (if not thousands) flocking to the black flag of jihad. By some estimates up to three hundred Americans currently fight for ISIS, all of them now enemy combatants against their own country. Britain faces an even worse crisis, with more of its Muslim young men volunteering to fight for ISIS than volunteering to serve in their own country’s armed forces.
But because the world is full of apologists for Islamic terror, it’s critical to enumerate ISIS’s crimes, including its crimes against Muslim law. After all, the fight against jihadist terror requires Muslim allies. One key to turning the tide against AQI during the Surge was persuading mass numbers of Sunni men to take up arms against terror, including some to change sides in the fight. These “Sons of Iraq,” part of the so-called Sunni Awakening, left the jihadists with nowhere to hide, allowing American soldiers to find and fight the enemy where it lived.
Similarly, in the battle against Hamas, Egypt has emerged as a key Israeli ally, far more helpful in the most recent fight against Hamas than the United States has been.
Why? Because the people of Egypt have a recent and bitter experience with Muslim Brotherhood rule, when Mohammed Morsi and a Brotherhood government initially replaced the Mubarak regime. Elected by a popular majority, the Brotherhood soon wore out its welcome, persecuting Egypt’s Christians, taking steps toward implementing Sharia, and providing assistance to terrorists while violating Egypt’s decades-old peace treaty with Israel. Egyptians responded with protests so vast that some called them the largest political protests in history, quickly deposing Morsi.
Consequently, the new Egyptian government, fully aware of the threat from the Muslim Brotherhood, rendered invaluable assistance to Israel, shutting down smuggling tunnels into the Gaza Strip and helping choke off Hamas’s access to key supplies.
The lesson? There is tremendous value in enlisting Muslim allies against jihad, allies like the Peshmerga in Kurdistan. At the same time, however, we must take great care in selecting those allies. While the Peshmerga have proven themselves, many of the so-called “moderate” Muslim rebels in Syria are nearly as bad as ISIS. In fact, there are now reports that these “moderates” may have kidnapped and sold American journalist Steven Sotloff to ISIS to be beheaded. Some of these “moderates” actively coopera
te with al-Qaeda and ISIS. We cannot and must not render the slightest aid and comfort to radical jihadists, no matter how “moderate” the American diplomatic elite claims them to be. Too many Americans have already died at the hands of “moderates.” We cannot be held captive to our own wishful thinking.
Still, the Muslim world must know the truth about ISIS. It must see that its strength (which is sadly attractive to many young Muslim men) comes about only through systematic violation of the very Muslim laws it claims to uphold, creating a world that is unbearably violent and oppressive for the citizens of jihadist-held territory.
Claiming to uphold Allah’s law, ISIS, in fact, routinely violates Sharia for its own purposes. Sharia law, for example, forbids a Muslim from killing another Muslim unless specific conditions are met. The Quran clearly states that “[i]f a man kills a Believer [Muslim] intentionally, his recompense is Hell, to abide therein (forever): and the wrath and the curse of Allah are upon him, and a dreadful penalty is prepared for him.”2 It also states that a Muslim may not take “life, which Allah hath made sacred, except by way of justice and law.”3
Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri, in Reliance of the Traveller (a manual of Sunni Sharia law), quotes a hadith (a record of Muhammad’s traditions or sayings) that states:
The blood of a Muslim man who testifies that there is no god but Allah and that I am the Messenger of Allah is not lawful to shed unless he be one of three: a married adulterer, someone killed in retaliation for killing another, or someone who abandons his religion and the Muslim community.4
Other pertinent hadiths are as follows:
“The killing of a believer [Muslim] is more heinous in Allah’s sight than doing away with all of this world.”5
“The Prophet said, ‘A Muslim is the one who avoids harming Muslims with his tongue and hands.’ ”6
“Some people asked Allah’s Apostle, ‘Whose Islam is the best? (i.e., Who is a very good Muslim?)’ He replied, ‘One who avoids harming the Muslims with his tongue and hands.’ ”7
“The Prophet said, ‘Abusing a Muslim is Fusuq (an evil doing) and killing him is Kufr (disbelief).’ ”8
ISIS routinely kills its foes, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, even when they have not taken up arms against ISIS or have not acted on behalf of any other group—and even when they are disarmed or wounded and wholly at ISIS’s mercy. Such killings not only constitute violations of Islamic law and morality; as we will discuss, they constitute war crimes.
But before we get into the details of ISIS’s violations of the laws of war and its war crimes, it is important to establish the general principles of the International Law of Armed Conflict. While the precise parameters of the law of war can be complex in any given situation, the law itself is governed by a few relatively simple principles.
First, all combatants must comply with the requirement of necessity. In other words, combatants are required to attack only those targets that are necessary to achieve a military objective.
Second, all combatants must comply with the requirement of distinction. This principle not only requires soldiers (and even jihadists) to distinguish between military and civilian targets when they strike; it also requires them to distinguish themselves from civilians. Soldiers wear uniforms not just for the camouflage value or other tactical values, but because the uniforms separate them from civilians. When jihadists fail to wear uniforms or other distinctive clothing that allows enemies to target them separately from civilians, they violate the law of war.
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While the precise parameters of the law of war can be complex in any given situation, the law itself is governed by a few relatively simple principles.
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Critically, when combatants violate the principle of distinction, they can convert a civilian target into a military target. So when jihadists use hospitals as command posts, launch rockets from mosques, or store weapons in U.N. facilities, they are converting each of those otherwise-protected civilian structures into legitimate military targets under the law of war.
Third, all combatants must comply with the requirement of proportionality. This is perhaps the most misunderstood legal principle in the law of war. It does not require, for example, the American military to fight terrorists only with the same weapons that terrorists use. We can respond to sniper fire or RPGs with air strikes. Instead it requires combatants to use the military force necessary to accomplish the military objective, but no more force beyond that. So, if a sniper is in a building, we can drop on that building but not intentionally demolish the entire city block.
Finally, when combatants are captured or incapacitated by wounds, there is a requirement of humane treatment. While the precise requirements for treatment vary depending on the captive’s status (prisoner of war or unlawful combatant), torture is always prohibited. At the very least, prisoners are entitled to basic medical care, shelter, and nutrition.
ISIS violates every single principle of the law of war.
ISIS routinely tortures its enemies in violation of international law. ISIS operates a number of detention facilities within its territory, which it uses to punish those who break Sharia law or oppose ISIS. Many of the prisons are clandestine, and few are known. Known detention centers in al-Raqqa, Syria, for example, include: the government building, Mabna al-Mohafaza; the Governor’s Palace, Qasr al-Mohafez; a former Ministry of Transport building, Idarat al-Markabat; and a parking garage, al-Mer’ab.9 A U-shaped building in Sadd al-Ba’ath, which was built in the late 1980s on the Euphrates River, exists as another known detention center.10 Others include an al-Akershi oil facility twelve miles east of al-Raqqa, a children’s hospital in the Qadi Askar area, and Maqar Ahmed Qaddour in the al-Haidariya area.11
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ISIS violates every single principle of the law of war.
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Individuals suspected of violating Sharia law or opposing ISIS, including children as young as eight years old, are abducted and transported to prisons where they are flogged, tortured, and summarily executed.12 Other targets for abduction and imprisonment include: members of the media, local council members, members of rival rebel groups, members of international organizations, and foreign religious figures.13
Reports from former detainees describe various modes of torture common in ISIS prisons: beating detainees with “generator belts, thick pieces of cable, sticks or other implements”14 and forcing detainees to remain in “contorted stress position[s] . . . for long periods, inducing severe pain and possible long-term muscular or other damage.”15 One detainee reports being “tortured with electric shocks and beaten with a cable while suspended with only one foot touching the floor.”16 Other detainees claimed that ISIS utilizes solitary confinement17 and electric shocks.18 Still other reports indicate that ISIS members flog early-teenage prisoners with anywhere from 30 to 94 lashes at a time.19
(As with all other ISIS tactics, this is nothing new. AQI maintained “torture houses” in territory it controlled, and our soldiers routinely uncovered the most gruesome scenes imaginable. The ones detailed below are only a portion of what can be described.)
ISIS routinely targets civilians and military prisoners (like Syrian or Iraqi soldiers) and executes summary justice against civilians and soldiers in the most brutal, inhumane ways possible. ISIS’s most recent wave of violent, public executions began in March 2014 when ISIS accused a shepherd of murder and theft and summarily executed him by shooting him in the head.20 In a grotesque, symbolic display of authority, ISIS fighters tied the lifeless body to a cross and displayed it in the public square.21 Again, in May 2014, ISIS publicly executed seven men in al-Raqqa, Syria, hanging two of the bodies on crosses and leaving them there for more than three days.22 A bystander who witnessed the killings claimed that the other five bodies were not displayed because the victims were all “children under the age of 18, one of them a seventh-grade student.”23 On May 29, 2014, militants from ISIS executed at least fifteen civilians in northern Syria by shoo
ting them in the head or chest.24 Residents said that at least six children were among those killed.25
Since ISIS’s surge back into Iraq, the group has escalated its violent shows of force. On June 15, 2014, ISIS released video footage of five unarmed Iraqi soldiers being taunted and forced to praise ISIS before being summarily shot.26 The ISIS soldier responsible for the execution then filmed himself saying, “Praise to Allah, whether he is a believer or not, I killed him. I killed a Shia! I killed a Shia!”27 On that same day, ISIS used social media to spread photographs and videos depicting massacres at seven different sites in Iraq.28 An analysis done by Human Rights Watch concluded that, in two mass graves near Tikrit, Iraq, ISIS left the bodies of between 160 and 190 men it had executed.29
ISIS has increasingly utilized decapitation to carry out its public executions, though it has also carried out executions in private and disseminated the execution videos through social media.30 For instance, on June 13, 2014, ISIS posted a picture of a decapitated head on Twitter, along with the following text: “This is our football, it’s made of skin #WorldCup.”31 By using the “WorldCup” hashtag, ISIS managed to expose the gruesome photograph to thousands of unsuspecting Twitter users who were simply following the FIFA World Cup on the social networking site.32 The law of war flatly prohibits the desecration of human remains.33